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This book needed to be written. It is no news to attorneys en-
gaged in the practice of corporation and securities law that there are
literally hundreds of SEC rules and regulations. Yet here is an en-
tire book on just one rule. But it is no news either that the rule in
question has spawned, and will continue to spawn, more litigation
than any part of the federal securities laws. For that reason alone,
this book was well worth the writing.
Rule lob-5 is perhaps the most controversial and least understood
aspect of securities regulation. It is also one of the most important
federal controls with respect to insider trading. Both the legitimacy
of its birth and the future of its life have been called into question.
In short, the argument has been advanced that the rule (or at least
its extension to situations like Cady, Roberts & Company'), being
a substantive rule rather than a procedural one, was not validly
promulgated within the formalities of the Administrative Procedure
Act.2 But the rule rumbles on. Indeed, as the author so aptly puts
it: "Today no business deal involving securities can safely be made
without considering it." 3
Broadly speaking, the following types of action may be brought
under rule lOb-5: 1. Civil injunction. The Securities and Exchange
Commission may apply to an appropriate United States district
court for an order enjoining any person from violating the rule.
2. Administrative proceedings to discipline broker-dealers. Such
proceedings may involve suspension or revocation of the broker-
dealer's registration, suspension or expulsion from membership in
a national securities dealers' association, and suspension or expulsion
from membership in a stock exchange. 3. Criminal prosecution.
Willful violation of rule lob-5 may result in criminal prosecution
t Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
2 See Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEo. WASH. L.
Rv. 473 (1967).
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by a local United States attorney. 4. Private enforcement by de-
frauded buyers, sellers, and other persons. Professor Bromberg's
book deals with these and related aspects of the rule and deals with
them well. After tracing the origin of the rule and its place among
existing fraud provisions, the author categorizes and exhaustively
treats the situations that may arise under it as follows: direct personal
dealing (face-to-face transactions, other than with broker-dealers);
direct personal dealing (broker-dealers); direct-impersonal dealing
(mergers, tender offers, etc.); indirect-impersonal dealing (stock
exchange and open market trades); private actions; criminal actions;
procedure and jurisdiction; and other aspects of the rule.
In recent years, the question with respect to rule lOb-5 that has
excited most comment is whether it provides for implied civil
liability, and, if so, to what extent. In most instances the courts
have permitted private rights of action under rule lOb-5. The author
apparently takes it for granted that the issue is, in effect, a closed
one.4 There is much to be said for this position, especially after
J. I. Case Company v. Borak,6 which permitted implied remedies un-
der the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. But a nag-
ging doubt remains. Some recent cases have braked the rule's appli-
cation.6 Those who would deny a private right of action insist
that Congress, in enacting sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, pro-
vided exclusive civil remedies, and that if it had intended to make
such a drastic change in this policy the following year it would have
done so expressly. Further, it is argued that the words "It shall be
unlawful" in the rule were directed solely to public enforcement by
the SEC in administrative actions and the United States in criminal
actions.
The answer given, of course, is that the remedies provided by
sections 11 and 12 were merely express remedies, and that rule lOb-5
affords implied private rights of action. Professor Bromberg dis--
cusses four somewhat overlapping theories which have been advanced
I"There is an implied right of civil recovery (and correlative liability) for viola-
tion of lOb-5, although such a right is expressly granted for other fraud provisions and
not for lOb-5." BROMBERG 27 n.47.
377 U.S. 426 (1963). See also Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371
(1966) (dictum recognizing the need for protection of small investors by this sort of
Temedy).
See, e.g., Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,996 (N.D. 111. June 28, 1967).
[Vol. 1968:417
BOOK REVIEW
in support of implied civil liability:7 (1) the statutory tort theory,
"that a person injured by violation of a statute enacted for the bene-
fit of persons in his position is entitled to recover his damages;" s
(2) the theory that since section 29 (b) of the 1934 Act makes all
contracts violative of the Act or rules promulgated under it void-
able, any transaction violating rule lOb-5 must be voidable by the
injured party in a civil action; (3) the arguable implication that
section 27 of the 1934 Act gives district courts jurisdiction over any
action brought to enforce a liability or duty created by the Act or
the rules and regulations thereunder; and (4) the theory that since
the policy of the Act was to protect the investing public, Congress
must have intended any violation of its rules to give rise to a private
remedy. Much is at stake when this question is argued. Sections
11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, in certain situations at least, contain
limiting requirements such as privity and reliance. Moreover, sec-
tion 10 and rule lOb-5 have no statute of limitations except the
governing state statute of limitations,9 while section 13 of the 1933
Act provides for short statutes of limitations for actions brought
under sections 11 and 12. If the attorney and his client can make
an end run around sections 11 and 12 to rule 1 Ob-5, they may move
forward free of the limitations contained in sections 11 and 12.
There is a middle ground: permit private rights of action under
rule lOb-5 but with the same limitations which attach to actions
brought under sections I I and 12. These important questions have
not yet been resolved by the United States Supreme Court. Pro-
fessor Bromberg proposes a legislative amendment to resolve some
of these problems. He advocates congressional ratification of the
doctrine of implied civil liability in order to end the controversy
on this question.' 0 To eliminate the present inconsistencies among
the antifraud provisions, he suggests abolition of the present trans-
7 BROMDERG 29-34.
Id. at 29.
"As the book points out, it is not always clear if the lOb-5 action.must be brought
within the period of the state's statute of limitations for fraud, or whether the period
of some other state statute, such as the "catch-all" statute of limitations, applies. The
question appears to turn on the court's view of how the state would characterize a
lOb-5 action, but Professor Bromberg suggests that a federal characterization would
be more appropriate. Id. at 41, 42 n.105.
10 Id. at 283. But the author expresses doubt as to the political feasibility of this
solution, suggesting that Congress may be more conservative than the courts, especially
in times of economic prosperity. Id. at 286.
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actional classifications and consolidation of all these provisions.
Short of this, he proposes the enactment of a federal statute of limi-
tations for 1 Ob-5, but argues that a three-year period, rather than one
year, is more appropriate.11
Another area of securities regulation that has attracted consider-
able attention in recent years is that of tender offers. It has been
suggested that rule lOb-5 may not be applicable to many such offers
because it is not activated unless there is a duty to disclose, and,
despite the rule's reference to "any person," there is arguably no
duty of disclosure unless there is a fiduciary or special relationship
between the parties to the transaction of purchase and sale.12 In his
discussion of this question,13 the author distinguishes between tender
offers by insiders, outsiders, and issuers. Insiders are probably sub-
ject to a disclosure duty equal in scope to that imposed when they
offer to buy directly from an individual shareholder. Plans for
disposition or change in the operation of the enterprise, information
as to material recent developments in the company, and perhaps the
insider's analysis of observed trends in the business, must be dis-
closed to avoid IOb-5 liability. The outsider, although subject to
1Ob-5 liability for misrepresentation and misleading omissions, is not
presently under any affirmative obligations to make disclosures.' 4
But Professor Bromberg points out that any information gleaned
from an insider probably must be disclosed. Moreover, he predicts
an extension of the lOb-5 disclosure requirement to the outsider who
has material information about the issuer or its management within
his peculiar knowledge. The author believes that insiders and out-
siders will probably be required to disclose their identity. But in
neither case should a court consider inadequacy of the price offered
shareholders in a tender offer a 1Ob-5 violation. Where the tender
offer is by the issuer, however, the possibility of unfair dilution or
change in control make it likely that price will have more legal
significance. Because the issuer has complete access to insider in-
". Id. at 284.
12 Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 13 F. Supp. 753, 764 (D.N.J. 1955); Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951) (dictum); see Cohen, A Note on
Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAVYER 149 (1966); Sowards
& Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST.
JOHN's L. Rav. 499 (1967).
'a BROMBERG 115-32.
"
4 Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); BROMBERG 119.
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formation and special influence on shareholders, its duty to disclose
"should, if anything, be greater than an insider's ....
It is fortunate that this book was published in loose-leaf form
and can be frequently updated, for much has occurred even in the
short time since its publication. Activity has been particularly in-
tense in the area of derivative suits charging acts resembling mis-
management or fiduciary breach rather than fraud.16 For several
reasons the courts, especially the Second Circuit, have been reluctant
to extend the federal law of corporations17 which has deireloped
under rule 1Ob-5 into this area. As the author points out, this
reluctance stems from a desire to avoid conflict with state policies,
both procedural and substantive, in this traditionally state-dom-
inated field, as well as from a difficulty in distinguishing between the
knowledge of the insiders and that of the corporation in order to
find some deception. Recent district court cases, however, bear
out Professor Bromberg's observation that "10b-5 has become a
powerful, if slightly erratic, tool in the enforcement of fiduciary
duties." 8
This review has touched on only a part of the wealth of material
contained in Professor Bromberg's book. But there is a full and
clear treatment of all relevant material in the book. The topic is
one with which lawyers will have to deal for years to come. It is a
must on the bookshelf.
HUGH L. SowARDs*
1 BROM ERG 130.
10 See id. at 83-88.
17 Id. at 83 & n.65.
28 Id. at 88; see Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Weitzen & Epstein
v. Kearns, [1966-1967 Tranfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,973 (S.D.N.Y. July 20,
1967). In the latter case the existence of a lOb-5 action for breach of corporate fiduciary
duties was openly recognized. The Entel court relied upon the rationale of A.T. Brod
& Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), and Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), for the proposition that an undisclosed breach of fiduciary duty
constituted a lOb-5 violation. 270 F. Supp. at 70. The Weitzen & Epstein court, on
the other hand, relied upon the non-imputation of director knowledge rationale ex-
pressed in Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), to find the
requisite lOb-5 deception of the corporation. But see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268
F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Delaware Management Co. [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fga. SEc. L. REP. 77,458 (SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8128, July 19,
1967), noted in 1967 Durx L.J. 1059; Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assess-
ment, 78 HARV. L. Rxv. 1146 (1965); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal
Law of Corporation by Implication through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. RYv. 185
(1964).
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